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Abstract 
This study investigates the trading activity in options and stock markets around informed 
events with extreme daily stock price movements. We find that informed agents are more 
likely to trade options prior to negative news and stocks ahead of positive news. We also 
show that optioned stocks overreact to the arrival of negative news, but react efficiently to 
positive news. However, the overreaction patterns are unique to the subsample of stocks with 
the lowest pre-event abnormal option/stock volume ratio (O/S). This finding suggests that the 
incremental benefit of option listing is related to the level of option trading activity, over and 
EH\RQGWKHSUHVHQFHRIDQRSWLRQVPDUNHWRQWKHILUP¶VVWRFNFinally, we find that the pre-
event abnormal O/S is a better predictor of stock price patterns following a negative shock 
than is the pre-event O/S, implying that the former may contain more information about the 
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1. Introduction 
We propose an innovative approach that we use to investigate several issues relating 
to the impact of option listing on the informational efficiency of the underlying stocks. Our 
analysis is based on examining transactions volumes in options and stock markets around 
³LQIRUPHG´VKRFNVLQH[FHVVRIVLJQLJQRUHG1 and relating the level of trading activity 
in options and stock to the stock price reaction to shocks. This approach allows us to address 
the following important questions empirically: Do informed traders prefer to trade options or 
stock? Does the relative concentration of informed traders in options or stock markets affect 
the informational efficiency of the underlying stocks?  
Whilst some of these issues have attracted a lot of attention in the literature, existing 
theoretical arguments remain ambiguous and empirical evidence is largely inconclusive. 
Figlewski (1989) argues that the effect of options introduction on the informational efficiency 
of the underlying stocks will mainly depend on the quality of information possessed by the 
newly attracted traders. Cox and Rubinstein (1985) argue that the opportunity to use options 
to construct portfolios that effectively circumvent restrictions imposed on selling short may 
increase the attractiveness of the options markets to informed traders. Thus, options may 
enhance the speed of price adjustment to information, enabling informed investors to trade 
more quickly and efficiently on their private information. However, Gorton and Pennacchi 
(1993) argue that options offer noise traders opportunities to hedge their stock positions at a 
low cost. Stein (1989) argues that, if options markets are more attractive to noisy traders, 
information released by option traders may inflict a negative externality on those traders 
already in the market, impairing their ability to make inferences from prices. In other words, 
the increased amount of noise trading in the options market may delay the speed at which 
new information is incorporated into the stock price. More recently, Roll et al. (2010) argue 
that the informational efficiency benefit from option listing should depend on whether the 
market for the listed option has sufficient volume, as informed traders would be more active 
in high-volume markets (Admati & Pfleiderer, 1988). 
 Consistent with the notion that informed traders prefer to trade options than stock, 
Easley et al. (1998) and Pan and Poteshman (2006) show that option trading volumes contain 
useful information about future stock prices. Cao et al. (2005) show that information 
asymmetry is greater in options than in stock and argue that informed agents find the options 
                                                          
1
 :HGHILQH³LQIRUPHG´GDLO\SULFHVKRFNVDVODUJHRQH-day price changes caused by the news announcements in 
the Regulatory News Service (RNS) of the London Stock Exchange (LSE).   
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markets to be more attractive venues for trading. Peterson (1995) and Choi and Jayaraman 
(2009) find that optioned stocks react more efficiently to large price declines than their non-
optioned counterparts. Roll et al. (2010) examine the trading volume in options (including 
both call and put contracts) relative to the trading volume in stocks (O/S) around earnings 
announcements. They argue that the positive association between pre-announcement O/S and 
post-announcement absolute returns implies that at least part of the pre-announcement option 
trading is informed2. However, many other studies provide evidence in favor of the view that 
informed traders prefer to transact in stock rather than options markets. Stephan and Whaley 
(1990) find that the price changes in the stock markets lead the options markets by as much 
as fifteen minutes. Similarly, Chan et al. (2002) show that the stock net-trading volume, but 
not the options net-trading volume, has a strong ability to predict stock and options quote 
revisions.  
By examining trading activities in options and stock prior to the arrival of price-
sensitive news, and relating these activities to the stock price reaction to informed shocks, 
this study contributes to the literature in at least two important ways. First, we argue that 
stock and options volume analysis around informed shocks offers an innovative approach to 
investigating whether traders prefer to initiate trades in options or stock prior to the arrival of 
news. Spyrou et al. (2011) provide evidence that informed traders are active in the options 
markets during the month preceding a mergers and acquisition announcement. However, their 
analysis does not necessarily imply that informed traders prefer to transact in options than 
stock markets. Building on Roll et al. (2010), we also use abnormal O/S to evaluate the 
relative trading activity in the options and stock markets around news announcements. We 
argue that the changes in trading activity around price-sensitive news announcements may be 
better captured by abnormal O/S than the standard O/S measure of Roll et al., as a high O/S 
ratio associated with a given firm may not be unique to the windows around news events. 
Roll et al. report high O/S around earnings announcements, but do not distinguish between 
positive and negative announcements. We argue that this distinction is important as short-sale 
constraints in the equity market may make options markets more attractive venues for trading 
on negative news than positive news.  
Second, we evaluate the extent to which abnormal option or stock trading can increase 
the speed at which information is incorporated into stock prices. Specifically, we examine the 
                                                          
2
 Roll et al. (2010) uses O/S to measure the relative trading activity in options and stock. They argue that an 
increase in O/S prior to the arrival of important news would indicate that relatively more informed trading is 
taking place in options than stock markets, and vice versa.    
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link between the level of option trading activity and the stock price reaction to new 
information, in order WR WHVW 5ROO HW DO¶V  SUHGLFWLRQ WKDW WKH LQFUHPHQWDO EHQHILW RI
option listing should be related to the level of option trading activity, as a thin, inactive 
market would repel all traders, both informed and uninformed. Our analysis differs from 
existing studies on the impact of option listing on stock price adjustments to shocks, such as 
Peterson (1995) and Choi and Jayaraman (2009), in a number of important aspects. First, we 
examine the impact of the level of option trading, rather than the availability of option trading 
RQ D ILUP¶V VWRFN RQ WKH VWRFN SULFH UHDFWLRQ WR VKRFNV 6HFRQG RXU DQDOysis focuses on 
³LQIRUPHG´HYHQWVRQO\ DV LQIRUPHG WUDGLQJ LV FRQGLWLRQHGRQ WKHSUHVHQFHRI LQIRUPDWLRQ
prior to large price changes (see also Larson & Madura, 2003). In other words, if some 
extreme price movements are caused by liquidity or noise trading, option trading activity 
prior to these events may not imply the presence of informed trading. Finally, we evaluate 
option and stock trading activity around both positive and negative shocks to test whether 
equity short-sale costs lead informed traders to trade options more frequently in the case of 
negative news than positive news.   
Our main findings can be summarized as follows. First, we show that daily abnormal 
O/S is statistically significant prior to large price declines, but not significantly different from 
zero in the period immediately prior to positive news announcements. This finding implies 
that informed traders are more likely to trade options in response to negative signals than 
positive ones. This evidence is robust to alternative option volume measures, estimation 
windows and definitions of price shocks. Second, we show that optioned stocks overreact to 
negative shocks, but react efficiently to positive ones. This result suggests that the existence 
of options markets does not always cause stock prices to react efficiently to shocks. It also 
indicates that the informational efficiency benefit of options may depend on other factors, 
including the relative trading activity in options and stock markets. We show that the positive 
rebound following a negative shock is negatively associated with pre-event abnormal O/S. In 
other words, our results suggest that the concentration of informed traders in options helps 
investors to estimate the true value of the stock. 7KLV ILQGLQJ VXSSRUWV 5ROO HW DO¶V 
view that the informational efficiency benefit of the options markets depends on the trading 
activity in options, over and above the mere listing of RSWLRQVRQ WKH ILUP¶V VWRFN Finally, 
both the subsample analysis and the regression results suggest that pre-event abnormal O/S is 
a better predictor of stock price patterns following a negative shock than is the pre-event O/S, 
implying that the former may contain more information about the future value of stocks than 
the latter. 
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 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the 
methodology. Section 3 describes our dataset and provides a brief summary of the descriptive 
statistics. Section 4 reports the empirical results and Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Empirical procedures 
This section describes the various variables used to evaluate the informational role of 
options and stock in the period preceding price-sensitive news announcements. Following 
other studies on the market reaction to price shocks (e.g. Cox & Peterson, 1994; Faff & 
Hillier, 2005; Mazouz et al. 2009), event study methods are used to estimate abnormal 
trading activities and abnormal returns around informed shocks.  
      
2.1. Abnormal volume estimates 
We begin our analysis by investigating the trading activities in options and stock 
markets prior to the arrival of price-sensitive news. We estimate the cross-sectional average 
abnormal volume on day t ሺܣܸ݋݈ݓǡݐതതതതതതതതതതതതሻ and over a ߨ ൌ ሾݐଵǡ ݐଶሿ window (ܣܸ݋݈ݓǡߨതതതതതതതതതതത) around the 
events as follows: 
              ܣܸ݋݈ݓǡݐതതതതതതതതതത ൌ  ? ܣܸ݋݈ݓǡ݅ǡݐܰ݅ൌ ? ܰ                                                                                              (1)                
                ܣܸ݋݈ݓǡߨതതതതതതതതതതത ൌ  ? ܣܸ݋݈ݓǡݐതതതതതതതതതതതݐ ?ݐൌݐ ?ߨ                                                                                               (2) 
 
where ܣܸ݋݈௪ǡ௜ǡ௧ is stock i¶VDEQRUPDOYROXPH on day t, measured as the difference between 
the daily volume (ܸ݋݈ݓǡ݅ǡݐ) and the average value of ܸ݋݈ݓǡ݅ǡݐ over T days, from -100 to -11, prior 
to the arrival of price-sensitive news, subscript w is replaced by s, o and o/s, respectively, 
when stock volume, option volume and the option to stock volume ratio (O/S) are analyzed, 
and N is the number of stocks included in the sample. Our use of the average values of 
trading measures over the window [-100, -11] as benchmarks is consistent with the early 
work of Bremer and Sweeney (1991) and Cox and Peterson (1994). Furthermore, we require 
each stock to have at least 30 non-missing observations in the 90-day window prior to the 
event in order to ensure that the abnormal measures are not affected by less frequently traded 
stocks.  
Stock i¶VGDLO\VWRFNYROXPHܸ݋݈ݏǡ݅ǡݐ), option volume (ܸ݋݈݋ǡ݅ǡݐ) and O/S (ܸ݋݈݋Ȁݏǡ݅ǡݐሻ are 
specified as 
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              ܸ݋݈ݏǡ݅ǡݐ ൌ ൬ܧܸܳܶ݅ǡݐܱܰܵܪ݅ǡݐ൰                                                                                                     (3) 
  ܸ݋݈݋ǡ݅ǡݐ ൌ ሺܰܥܲ݅ǡݐሻ                                                                                                  (4) 
             ܸ݋݈݋Ȁݏǡ݅ǡݐ ൌ  ൬ ܰܥܲ݅ǡݐܧܸܳܶ݅ǡݐ൰                                                                                                (5) 
  
where ܧܳܶ ௜ܸǡ௧ and ܱܰܵܪ݅ǡݐ are stock i¶V GDLO\ WUDGLQJ YROXPH DQG WKH QXPEHU RI VKDUHV
outstanding on day t, respectively and ܰܥܲ݅ǡݐ is the total number of daily traded option 
contracts (including both puts and calls) on stock i3. The Newey-West adjusted t-statistic 
(NW t-stat) is used to verify the statistical significance of the relevant abnormal volume 
measure. 
We argue that the use of abnormal O/S to assess the relative informativeness of traders 
in options and stock markets forms an important methodological innovation in this study. 
5ROOHWDO¶V26PHDVXUHPD\OHDGWRPLVOHDGLQJFRQFOXVLRQVRQWKHUHODtive ability of 
options and stock markets to attract informed traders, as some firms may have consistently 
higher O/S for reasons unrelated to the arrival of information.  
 
2.2. Stock price reaction to informed shocks 
We examine the link between option trading activity and the informational efficiency of 
the underlying stocks by analyzing stock price patterns following informed daily price 
changes in excess of 10% (sign ignored). The purpose of this analysis is to investigate 
whether the ability of options markets to stimulate informational efficiency depends on the 
level of option trading activity. We use the following equation to estimate daily abnormal 
returns (ܣܴ݅ǡݐሻ around the events (see, e.g., Edmister et al., 1994; Mazouz and Saadouni, 
2007):  
 ܣܴ݅ǡݐ ൌܴ݅ǡݐ െןෝ݌ݎ݁െ ߚ෡݌ݎܴ݁݉ǡݐ                                                                                    (6)                             
 
where ܴ݅ǡݐ is the continuously compounded return of stock i on day t, computed from the mid-
point of the bid and ask prices to control for the bid-ask bounce; ܴ݉ǡݐ is the continuously 
compounded return on the market portfolio (FTSE All Share Index) at time t; ןෝ݌ݎ݁ and ߚ෡݌ݎ݁ 
                                                          
3
 In the case of zero option volume, we add one to ܰܥ ௜ܲǡ௧ before taking the log (see, e.g., Sanders and 
Zdanowicz , 1992).  
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are the coefficients of the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates for the standard market 
model over the [-201, -11] window prior to the event. 
  To calculate the cumulative abnormal returns (ܥܣܴ݅ǡ߬) for stock i over a window of ߬ 
days starting one day after the price shock, we use 
 
           ܥܣܴ݅ǡ߬ ൌ  ? ܣܴ݅ǡݐ߬ݐൌ ?                                                                                                      (7) 
 
The average cumulative abnormal return over a window of ߬ days, beginning one day 
after the shock, and across N stocks, is estimated as  
 ܥܣܴ߬ ൌ  ?ܰ ? ܥܣܴ݅ǡ߬ܰ݅ൌ ?                                                                                                    (8) 
 
We use the NW t-stat4 to assess the statistical significance of ܥܣܴ݅ǡ߬ and ܥܣܴ߬. We also 
employ the non-parametric Mann-Whitney (MW) and Kruskal-Wallis (KW) tests to examine 
whether the abnormal returns associated with different groups of stocks are statistically 
different from each other. 
 
3. Data and sample characteristics 
Our analysis is based on a sample of the London Stock Exchange (LSE) stocks with 
options listed on the Euronext5 over the period from January 1993 to June 2010. To be 
included in the sample, a stock must have data available from DataStream on the option 
trading volume, the stock turnover and the stock price. Firm news is extracted from the 
Factiva news database owned by Dow Jones & Company. Since the regulatory news category 
in Factiva is compulsory for the exchange house to disclose to the public, we searched for 
regulatory news on our stocks across the sample period. We matched the date of a price 
shock, which is defined as a one-day price movement in excess of 10% (sign ignored), with 
the dates of news announcements from the Factiva database.  
                                                          
4
 We also used the standard t-test to gauge the statistical significance of the abnormal returns. The results are not 
reported here, because they are quantitatively very similar to the results generated from the NW adjusted t-
statistics. Further details are available upon request.  
5
 Since our sample period is from 1993 to 2010, we also include stocks whose options were listed in the London 
International Financial Futures and Options Exchange (LIFFE) before December 2001. In December 2001, the 
Euronext acquired the shares of the LIFFE.  
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We define our observation window as the eleven days around a large price change, 
i.e. day -5 to day +5. The use of a five-day post-event window is justified by the findings in 
the literature that most of the price reversals for large firms are short-lived, with significant 
abnormal returns observed only in the first three event days after price shocks (Peterson, 
1995; Choi & Jayaraman, 2009). The pre-event five-day window is included in our analysis 
to account for the behavior of informed traders who may take advantage of information 
leakage before events. To avoid confounding effects, multiple price shocks in a single 
observation window are excluded from the analysis6. We also require from each firm a 
complete set of 150 daily return series over the [-200, -11] window in order to estimate 
abnormal returns. Each event must have at least one data point of option trading volume in 
the [-5, -1] and [+1, +5] windows. Our final sample consists of 137 stocks with 504 (217 
negative and 287 positive) shocks matched with news announcements. More details on the 
event filtering and news announcement classifications are provided in Appendix A and 
Appendix B, respectively.  
Panel A in Table 1 compares the characteristics of our sample stocks with those of the 
FTSE All Share Index constituents over the period 1993-2010. The mean values of the price, 
market capitalization and standard deviation of the sample stocks are higher than those in the 
50th, but lower than those in the 90th, percentile of FTSE All Share constituents. The average 
daily turnover of the sample stocks exceeds that of the 90th percentile portfolio of highest 
liquid index constituents. Thus, the figures in Table 1 imply that our sample is biased towards 
large, liquid and volatile stocks. This bias is consistent with Mayhew and Mihov¶V (2004) 
finding that option exchanges are often forward looking and tend to list options on stocks 
with high market capitalization, trading volume and volatility. 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------     
Panel B in Table 1 reports percentiles of price changes for the sample stocks across 
4,420 trading days from 4th January 1993 to 30th June 2010. The first row reports the time-
series averages of the cross-sectional means across each trading day. The table shows that the 
price change of the first percentile is -2.69% and that of the 99th percentile is +2.66%. The 
second row in Panel B reports pooled time-series and cross-sectional averages of price 
changes with 516,963 firm-day observations. The first and 99th percentiles of price changes 
                                                          
6
 In unreported results, we found that ignoring the confounding effects did not alter our conclusions. Further 
details are available upon request. 
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are -6.09% and +6.69%, respectively. This result suggests that 10%r  price shocks are indeed 
extreme events for individual stocks across the trading days in the sample. 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of the different volume measures used in our 
analysis. For each volume measure, we compute the time-series mean across 4,420 days for 
each stock and then calculate the cross-sectional mean by averaging for the time-series means 
across the 137 sample stocks. Panel A-1, Panel B-1 and Panel C-1 in Table 2 show that the 
averages of raw stock volume, options volume and O/S are 0.01, 226.36, and 28.3, 
respectively. The means of the raw volumes are much larger than the corresponding medians 
of 0.01, 85.97, and 1.69, implying that the means are influenced by outliers. The Jarque-Bera 
test indicates that the daily cross-sectional averages of the three volume series deviate from 
normality. To mitigate the influence of possible outliers, we use the natural logarithm of each 
of the volume variables in Panel A-2, Panel B-2 and Panel C-2. The Jarque-Bera test in Table 
2 also indicates that the log values of options volume and O/S are normally distributed, but 
the log values of stock volume deviate from normality.  
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 3 provides cross-sectional summary statistics of the partial autocorrelation up to 
five lags of ܸ݋݈ݏ,ܸ݋݈௢ and ܸ݋݈݋Ȁݏ, respectively. It shows that the partial correlations of all 
the volume measures are positive and decline monotonically over time. The positive 
autocorrelations may reflect the behavior of informed traders, who may begin trading a few 
days ahead of the arrival of news and trade slowly to maximize their profits (Kyle, 1985; Roll 
et al., 2010). To mitigate the influence of autocorrelation on our results, we use the NW t-stat 
to assess the statistical significance of the abnormal volume measures.             
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
      
4. Empirical results 
4.1. Informed trading in options and stock markets 
The levels of trading activity in options and stock prior to the arrival of price-sensitive 
news are used to investigate whether informed traders are more likely to transact in options or 
stock. Table 4 reports the results on the various abnormal volume estimates for the period 
immediately before the arrival of price-sensitive news. Panel A of Table 4 shows that the 
average abnormal stock volume over the [-5,-1] and [-3, -1] windows around negative news 
11 
 
announcements is positive, but not statistically significant. The highest level of stock trading 
activity of 0.0188 (with a NW t-stat of 6.49) is observed on the day of the negative news 
announcement, and a significantly positive abnormal stock volume of 0.0019 is reported one 
day prior to the arrival of negative news. However, the abnormal stock volumes associated 
with days -2 through -5 prior to negative news are positive, but not statistically significant. 
This finding indicates that stock market traders anticipate the arrival of negative news one 
day before the announcement date. Our evidence is consistent with the view that at least some 
informed trading is taking place in the stock market prior to the arrival of news (see, e.g., 
Easley et al., 2002; Pan & Poteshman, 2006; Spyrou et al., 2011). 
Panel A of Table 4 also reports the pre-negative-shock abnormal option volume. The 
average cumulative abnormal option volumes over the [-5,-1] and [-3,-1] windows preceding 
negative shocks are 30.79% and 44.57%, respectively. Both figures are significant at the 5% 
level. The highest daily abnormal option volume of 155.74% is reported on the negative news 
announcement dates. The abnormal option volumes on days -3 through -1 prior to a negative 
news announcement are positive and statistically significant. This finding suggests that option 
traders anticipate the arrival of negative news two days earlier than stock traders. Panel A of 
Table 4 also reports significantly positive abnormal O/S of 20.00% and 31.01% over the [-5, -
1] and [-3, -1] windows, respectively. The abnormal O/S on days -4 through -2 are also 
positive and significant at least at the 10% level. These findings are consistent with the view 
that option traders are more active than stock traders in the period preceding a negative news 
announcement (see, e.g., Cox & Rubinstein, 1985; Chakravarty et al., 2004). 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 Panel B in Table 4 reports the abnormal trading activity in options and stock in the 
periods preceding events with positive news announcements. It shows that the average 
abnormal stock volumes over the [-5, -1] and [-3,-1] windows preceding positive shocks are 
0.0010 and 0.0014, respectively. These figures are significant at the 5% level. By comparing 
the results in Panels A and B, we can see that the magnitude of the abnormal stock volume 
associated with positive shocks is nearly two times larger than that observed in the case of 
negative shocks. This result shows that abnormal stock trading is more pronounced prior to 
positive news than negative news. Similar to the case of negative shocks, we also report the 
highest daily abnormal stock volume of 0.0188 (with a NW t-stat of 6.23) on the positive 
news announcement dates. The significantly positive abnormal volumes associated with days 
-4, -2 and -1 imply that stock market traders anticipate the arrival of positive news and begin 
12 
 
their trading before the announcement dates 2XU UHVXOWV DUH LQ OLQH ZLWK .RUF]DN HW DO¶V
(2010) evidence that insider trading in the stock market is more prevalent before good than 
bad news announcements. 
 Panel B in Table 4 reports the highest daily abnormal option volume (of 208.87%) on 
the dates of positive news announcements. However, unlike the case of abnormal stock 
volume, the abnormal option volume in the period immediately before the arrival of positive 
news is not statistically significant, indicating that informed agents may prefer to trade stock 
rather than options when they anticipate the arrival of good news. The results in Panel B also 
indicate that the abnormal O/S over the windows of [-5, -1] and [-3,-1] prior to good news are 
negative, but not statistically significant. The abnormal O/S on day -5 through -1 are also not 
statistically different from zero, implying that the option volume does not lead the stock 
volume in the period preceding a positive news announcement. Roll et al. (2010) show that 
O/S is high around earnings announcements. However, the authors do not distinguish 
between announcements with positive and negative price impacts. Thus, our results imply 
that the decision to transact options or stock depends on the type of information possessed by 
informed agents. Collectively, our findings suggest that informed agents are more likely to 
trade options ahead of bad news and stock when they anticipate the arrival of good news7.  
 
4.2. Option trading and stock price reactions to shocks 
We examine the link between trading activity in options and stock and the stock price 
patterns following informed daily price changes in excess of 10% (sign ignored) so as to 
assess the ability of the options markets to stimulate the informational efficiency of the 
underlying stocks. The results of this analysis are reported in Table 5. The figures in Table 5 
indicate that the average values of positive and negative shocks are 11.25% and -12.84%, 
respectively. The cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) following positive informed shocks 
are not significantly different from zero, implying that optioned stocks react efficiently to the 
arrival of positive price-sensitive news. However, the CARs subsequent to negative informed 
shocks are all positive and statistically significant, ranging from 0.97% (with a NW t-stat of 
2.39) on day 1 to 2.42% (with a NW t-stat of 3.46) on day 5. This finding is consistent with 
                                                          
7
 To shed further light on the issue of whether abnormal O/S reflects the trading activity of informed traders, we 
compare the abnormal O/S prior to informed shocks with the abnormal O/S observed in periods immediately 
before uninformed shocks. We find that the abnormal O/S before an uniformed shock is not significantly 
different from zero and its magnitude is significantly smaller than the abnormal O/S preceding an informed 
shock. This finding indicates that the pre-event abnormal O/S is likely to reflect the behavior of informed 
traders. Further details on these results are available upon request.    
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the overreaction hypothesis, which suggests that investors respond too strongly to 
unfavorable information and temporarily price securities below their intrinsic value (see, e.g., 
Howe, 1986; Bremer & Sweeney, 1991; Cox & Peterson, 1994), but contradicts Choi and 
-D\DUDPDQ¶V  HYidence that only non-optioned stocks overreact to the arrival of 
negative news in the US market. We argue that the different reactions of the UK and US 
optioned stocks to negative news may be related, at least partly, to the differences in the 
levels of option and stock trading activity in these markets8.  
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 5 about here 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
We use subsample analysis to investigate the relationship between option and stock 
trading activity and stock price efficiency. Specifically, we examine the price reaction to 
negative shocks associated with three subsamples (the top 30%, middle 40% and bottom 
30%) of stocks ranked on the basis of abnormal options volume, abnormal stock volume, 
abnormal O/S and O/S over the [-3, -1] window around the events, respectively9. A summary 
of these results is presented in Table 6. Panel A of Table 6 shows that the stocks with high 
levels of pre-event option trading activity react efficiently to negative price shocks while the 
overreaction effect is only observed in the case of stocks with low pre-event abnormal 
options volume. However, the paired t-test suggests that the CAR1 and CAR2 associated with 
the subsamples of stocks with high and low pre-event options volume are not significantly 
different from each other. The non-parametric MW test also suggests that, with the exception 
of CAR4 and CAR5, the post-shock abnormal returns associated with stocks with high and 
low pre-event option volumes belong to the same distribution. Similarly, for CAR1 to CAR3, 
the KW test fails to reject the hypothesis that the post-event CARs of the three subsamples 
ranked by pre-event option volume are drawn from the same distribution. 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 6 about here 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
Panel B of Table 6 reports the post-event abnormal returns associated with the 
subsamples of low, medium and high pre-event abnormal stock volume. The CARs 
associated with the three subsamples are positive, but not statistically significant in most 
                                                          
8
 The difference in the reactions of the US and UK markets to shocks may be related to other factors, including 
insider trading regulations (Fidrmuc et al., 2006), executive option trades, option market regulation, and taxation 
differences on profits from option trading (Kyriacou et al., 2008). 
9
 We also ranked our stocks on the basis of volume measures over the [-5, -1] window. The results were 
quantitatively similar and are available upon request.   
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cases. The paired t-test and the MW test suggest that the post-shock CARs for stocks with 
high and low abnormal stock volume are not significantly different from each other. The KW 
test also fails to reject the hypothesis that the post-shock CARs associated with the 
subsamples ranked by abnormal stock volume are drawn from the same distribution.  
Panel C of Table 6 reports the post-event CARs associated with the subsamples of 
high, medium and low pre-event abnormal O/S stocks. The results imply that stocks with 
high abnormal O/S react efficiently, while stocks with low and medium abnormal O/S 
overreact, to the arrival of negative news. The paired t-test suggests that the post-shock CARs 
of stocks with low abnormal O/S are significantly larger than the post-shock CARs of those 
with high abnormal O/S. The MW test also rejects the hypothesis that the post-event CARs of 
stocks with high and low abnormal O/S belong to the same distribution. Similarly, the results 
of the KW test suggest that the post-event abnormal returns are significantly different across 
the low, medium and high subsamples. This finding LV FRQVLVWHQW ZLWK 5ROO HW DO¶V 
view that the contribution of options to stock price efficiency depends on the level of option 
trading activity above and beyond the presence of options markets.  
  Earlier, we argued that abnormal O/S may capture informed trading activity in 
options and stock better than the standard O/S. As a first attempt to verify the validity of this 
claim, we examine the post-shock price patterns associated with subsamples of stocks ranked 
on the basis of their O/S over the [-3,-1] window around the events. The results of this 
analysis are reported in Panel D of Table 6. Similar to the case of abnormal O/S, the t-stat 
suggests that the post-event CARs are only significant in the case of stocks with low pre-
event O/S. However, the difference in CARs between stocks with high and low trading 
activity is more pronounced when abnormal O/S rather than O/S is used as the trading 
activity measure. Unlike in the case of abnormal O/S, the paired t-test in Panel D indicates 
that the CAR1 and CAR2 associated with the subsamples of stocks with high and low pre-
event O/S are not significantly different from each other. Similarly, with the exception of 
CAR5, the MW test fails to reject the hypothesis that the post-event CARs associated with 
stocks with high and low pre-event O/S belong to the same distribution. Similar results are 
reported when the KW test is used to test whether the post-event CARs associated with 
stocks with high, medium and low pre-event O/S belong to the same distribution. 
Collectively, our results indicate that pre-event abnormal O/S is a better predictor of stock 
price patterns following negative shocks than pre-event O/S, implying that the former may 
contain more information about the future value of stocks than the latter.  
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4.3. Regression analysis  
The previous section examines the impact of trading activity on the speed of stock 
price adjustments to information. Consistent with the view that active options markets 
improve stock price efficiency, we show that high pre-event abnormal O/S stocks experience 
significant price drops on the bad news announcement date and no significant abnormal 
returns on subsequent days. In this section, we investigate the relationship between trading 
activity measures and the sensitivity of stock prices to negative news announcements. Roll et 
al. (2010) argue that high levels of informed trading prior to an earnings announcement 
would be expected to result in bigger price movements after the announcement. Thus, the 
extent to which a trading activity measure can reflect informed trading is likely to depend on 
the ability of such a measure to predict the price movement caused by a news announcement. 
This issue is formally investigated using the following regression model10: 
 ܥܣܴ݅ǡ߬ ൌߙ ?൅ߙ ?ܣܸ݋݈݅ǡݓǡሾെ ?Ǥെ ?ሿതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതത൅ ߙ ?ܯܸ݅ ൅ ߙ ?ܤܶܯܸ݅ ൅ ߙ ?ܯܱܯ݅ ൅ ൅ߙହܴ݅ݏ௜ǡ௦ ൅ ߱௜                                                                                                               (10) 
 
where ܥܣܴ݅ǡ߬ is the cumulative abnormal return of stock i over a window of ߬ days starting 
from the event (i.e. negative shock). lnܤܶܯܸ݅  and ܯܸ݅ are the natural logarithms of stock 
i¶V book-to-market ratio and market capitalization measure on day -11 prior to the event, 
respectively. Fama and French (1993, 1996) show that the size and value characteristics are 
the key determinants of cross-sectional stock returns. Similarly, Bremer and Sweeney (1991) 
argue that the price reaction to a shock depends on the market capitalization of the firm. The 
variableܯܱܯ௜ is the momentum factor measured over the six-month period prior to the 
event date. Carhart (1997) shows that the momentum factor explains a significant proportion 
of the cross-sectional return variation. ܴ݅ݏ݅ǡݏ is the volatility of the stock return measured over 
the [-100, -11] window prior to the event date. Campbell et al. (2001) and Fu (2009) report a 
positive association between stock volatility, a measure of idiosyncratic risk, and cross-
sectional stock returns. ܣܸ݋݈݅ǡݓǡሾെ ?Ǥെ ?ሿതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതത is stock i¶VDYHUDJHDEQRUPDOYROXPHRYHUWKH>-3,-1] 
window around the event, where subscript w is replaced by s, o and o/s, respectively, when 
                                                          
10
 We use this regression for negative shocks only, as the CARs following positive shocks are not significantly 
different from zero. We also used the volume estimated over the [-5, -1] window instead of the [-3, -1] window, 
as one of the explanatory variables in Eq.(10). The results were similar to those reported here and are available 
upon request. 
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abnormal stock volume, abnormal option volume and abnormal O/S are analyzed. ߱݅ is the 
error term.  
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 7 about here 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 Table 7 reports the results of the OLS estimation of Eq.(10). The coefficients on ܣܸ݋݈݋ǡሾെ ?ǡെ ?ሿതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതത in Panel A of Table 7 are negative, but only significant in the case of CAR[0, +5]. 
The coefficients on ܣܸ݋݈ݏǡሾെ ?ǡെ ?ሿതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതത  in Panel B are not significantly different from zero, 
implying that the level of trading activity in stocks does not predict the post-event CARs. 
Panel C shows that ܣܸ݋݈݋Ȁݏǡሾെ ?ǡെ ?ሿതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതത is negatively and significantly associated with all the post-
shock CARs. This finding suggests that pre-event abnormal O/S may capture the extent of 
informed trading, as more informed trading prior to the negative events may result in greater 
price declines in the post-event periods. For comparison purposes, we also estimate Eq.(10) 
using average pre-event O/S over the window [-3,-1] around the events (ܸ݋݈݋Ȁݏǡሾെ ?ǡെ ?ሿതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതത) as an 
alternative trading activity measure. The results in Panel D of Table 7 show that ܸ݋݈݋Ȁݏǡሾെ ?ǡെ ?ሿതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതത 
is also negatively associated with the post-event CARs, but its coefficient is only significant 
when CAR[0,+1] is used as the dependent variable. To gain further insight into whether 
informed trading is better captured by pre-event abnormal O/S or pre-event O/S, we also 
include both ܣܸ݋݈݋Ȁݏǡሾെ ?ǡെ ?ሿതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതത and ܸ݋݈݋Ȁݏǡሾെ ?ǡെ ?ሿതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതത as explanatory variables in Eq.(10)11. While the 
details are not reported, so as to save space, the results indicate that ܣܸ݋݈݋Ȁݏǡሾെ ?ǡെ ?ሿതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതത is 
negatively and significantly associated with the post-event CARs but the coefficients on ܸ݋݈݋Ȁݏǡሾെ ?ǡെ ?ሿതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതത are not significantly different from zero. This finding, therefore, suggests that 
informed trading may be better captured by pre-event abnormal O/S than pre-event O/S.  
The coefficients on ݈݊ܤܸܯܸ݅ in Table 7 are consistently positive and statistically 
significant, implying that growth stocks react less strongly to negative market signals than to 
value stocks. This finding is consistent with Rozeff and Zaman (1998), who show that growth 
stocks tend to lie above their fundamental values and value stocks tend to lie below their 
fundamental values. The remaining variables in Table 7, namely ܯܸ݅, ܯܱܯ݅ and ܴ݅ݏ݅ǡݏ, 
are statistically insignificant in most cases.  
 
                                                          
11
 While the correlation between ܣܸ݋݈௢Ȁ௦ǡሾିଷǡିଵሿതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതത and ܸ݋݈݋Ȁݏǡሾെ ?ǡെ ?ሿതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതത is quite high (0.532), the variance inflation 
factor (VIF) indicates that including both variables in the regression does not result in multicollinearity 
problems.  
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4.4. Robustness checks 
We carry out a number of robustness checks to investigate the sensitivity of our 
findings to alternative volume measures, the length of the pre-event benchmark period, and 
an alternative definition of shocks. The results of the robustness checks are presented in 
Table 8. To save space, we only report the results associated with using ܣܸ݋݈௢Ȁ௦ǡ௜ǡ௧ as a 
trading activity measure12. 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 8 about here 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
4.4.1. Pound volume measure 
In this subsection, we examine the robustness of our earlier findings to the use of the 
pound options volume, rather than the number of options contracts traded on each stock, as 
an options volume measure. Following Roll et al. (2010), we define stock i¶V GDLO\ SRXQG
options volume as the aggregated value of the total contracts traded on each option multiplied 
by the end-of-day quote midpoint. As stated earlier, we define the stock pound volume as the 
total number of stocks traded multiplied by the closing price on each trading day. Thus, 
pound O/S is the option pound volume over the stock pound volume. Since data on the 
options volume in pounds are only available from January 2006, fewer informed shocks (111 
positive and 101 negative) are identified during this period. Panel A of Table 8 reports the 
pre-shock abnormal pound O/S. The results indicate that the pre-negative shock ܣܸ݋݈௢Ȁ௦ǡ௧ is 
positive, but only significant on days -3 and -2. The ܣܸ݋݈௢Ȁ௦ǡగതതതതതതതതതതതത over windows [-5, -1] and [-3, 
-1] is also positive. The NW t-stats indicate that the pre-negative-shock ܣܸ݋݈௢Ȁ௦ǡగതതതതതതതതതതതത is 
significant at the 10% level. Panel A of Table 8 further suggests that the pre-event ܣܸ݋݈௢Ȁ௦ǡ௧ 
and ܣܸ݋݈௢Ȁ௦ǡగ associated with the positive shocks are also positive but not statistically 
significant. The asymmetric abnormal O/S patterns are consistent with our earlier evidence 
that informed agents are more likely to transact options ahead of negative news. 
   
 
4.4.2. The magnitude of the price shock   
Definitions of price shocks tend to vary considerably across studies. For example, 
Dennis and Strickland (2002) define shocks as daily market price declines in excess of 2%, 
                                                          
12
 The results associated with ܣܸ݋݈௦ǡ௧ and ܣܸ݋݈௢ǡ௧ are available upon request. 
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Bremer and Sweeney (1991) use daily price drops of 10% or more, and Howe (1986) 
employs weekly price changes of more than 50%. To verify the sensitivity of our results to 
the identification of extreme events, we repeat our analysis using one-day price movements in 
excess of 5% (sign ignored) as price shocks. Applying the filtering process described in 
Section 3 to the 5% price changes, we identified a total of 730 informed shocks (287 negative 
and 443 positive). The results are presented in Panel B of Table 8. The results show that the 
abnormal O/S preceding both positive and negative shocks are positive. They also show that 
abnormal O/S is more pronounced prior to negative shocks than positive ones. Specifically, 
our statistical test implies that the abnormal O/S are significantly positive on days -2 and -1 
prior to negative shocks and only on day -1 prior to positive shocks. Furthermore, the results 
in Panel B suggest that the abnormal O/S over the windows [-5, -1] and [-3, -1] are only 
statistically significant in the case of negative shocks. This finding is again consistent with 
our earlier evidence that option traders are more likely to trade ahead of negative news than 
positive news. 
 
4.4.3. Pre-event benchmark period    
There is no consensus in the empirical literature on the choice of the pre-event 
benchmark period. To investigate the sensitivity of our findings to the choice of estimation 
windows, we repeat our analysis using the averaged volume in the pre-event period [-120, -
20] as an alternative benchmark. Panel C of Table 8 shows that, with the exception of day -5, 
the values of ܣܸ݋݈௢Ȁ௦ǡ௜ǡ௧ on the days immediately before announcements of bad news with 
large price impacts are positive and significant. Furthermore, the abnormal O/S over the [-5, -
1] and [-3, -1] windows are 21.68% and 32.69%, respectively. The NW t-stat implies that 
these figures are significant at less than the 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Panel C of 
Table 8 also reports abnormal O/S prior to positive shocks. It also shows that the abnormal 
O/S preceding positive shocks are not significantly different from zero and that their 
magnitudes are generally smaller than those observed prior to negative shocks. This finding is 
consistent with our earlier evidence suggesting that informed traders are less active in options 
markets before positive news. 
  
5. Conclusion 
This study provides an innovative approach to investigating informed trading activity 
in the stock and options markets. Our analysis yields the following important conclusions. 
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First, the pre-event abnormal volume analysis indicates that informed agents are more likely 
to trade in the options market ahead of bad news than good news. Specifically, we report 
significant abnormal option volumes prior to negative shocks and significant abnormal stock 
volumes in the periods immediately before positive shocks. We show that pre-event abnormal 
O/S is only significant in the case of negative news, indicating that, due to short-sale 
constraints, informed traders are more likely to transact in options in response to negative 
signals than positive ones. These findings are robust to alternative definitions of event 
windows, options volume measures and price shocks.  
Second, by examining stock price reactions to shocks, we show that the impact of 
option listing on the informational efficiency of stocks depends on the option trading activity 
over and above the presence of an options market. Specifically, we show that optioned stock 
prices react efficiently to informed positive shocks, but overreact to negative ones. The 
overreaction of optioned stocks to negative news contradicts the US evidence of Peterson 
(1995) and Choi and Jayaraman (2009), and implies that listing options on stocks does not 
necessarily result in efficient stock markets. Further analysis suggests that the price reaction 
to shocks depends largely on the pre-event abnormal O/S, with low pre-shock abnormal O/S 
stocks overreacting to negative news and high pre-shock abnormal O/S stocks reacting 
efficiently to the arrival of negative information.  
)LQDOO\ZHVKRZWKDWDEQRUPDO26RXWSHUIRUPV5ROOHWDO¶V26DVDPHDVXUH
of informed trading activity. Specifically, both the subsample analysis and the regression 
results indicate that pre-event abnormal O/S is a better predictor of stock price patterns 
following negative shocks than pre-event O/S, suggesting that the former may contain more 
relevant information about the future value of stocks than the latter.     
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TABLE1. Sample stock characteristics  
Panel A: Stock Characteristics 
  Price (£) 
Daily 
turnover 
(%) 
Daily   
bid-ask 
spread 
(%) 
MV          £1 
million 
Return 
volatility 
(%) 
ȕ 
Our sample137 stocks 6.41  0.96  0.76  9,564.00  2.13  0.85  
All constituent stocks 4.19  0.52  1.94  2,156.00  1.89  1.00  
10th  percentile portfolio 2.31  0.24  4.84  42.31  2.14  0.33  
50th  percentile portfolio 3.64  0.35  1.86  249.27  1.69  0.46  
90th  percentile portfolio 7.80  0.59  0.41  17,055.47  2.03  1.08  
Panel B: Daily Price Change 
Percentile 1% 5% 10% 90% 95% 99% 
Daily price change -0.0269 -0.0150 -0.0100 0.0100 0.0144 0.0266 
Pooled daily price change -0.0609 -0.0316 -0.0207 0.0218 0.0333 0.0669 
 
Note: Panel A in the table compares the characteristics of our sample stocks with those of the constituents of the 
FTSE All Share Index over the period 04/01/1993 to 30/06/2010. The reported figures represent the mean values 
of the stock price, daily turnover (daily trading volume over the number of shares outstanding), daily bid-ask 
spread (computed as  ௔೔ǡ೟ି௕೔೟൫ሺ௔೔ǡ೟ା௕೔೟ሻ ଶ ? ൯, with ܾ௜ǡ௧ and ܽ௜௧  denoting stock i¶VELGSULFHDQGDVNSULFHUHVSHFWLYHO\09
(market capitalization), return volatility (or standard deviation of returns) and the market model beta. The mean 
values of the stock price, daily turnover, daily bid-ask spread, and MV are computed from time-series averages 
of cross-sectional means; return volatility is the yearly averaged standard deviation of daily returns; the mean 
beta value is the average of the betas from the time-series regressions for each stock over the entire sample 
period. The 10th, 50th, and 90th portfolios are based on total market capitalization at the beginning of each year 
from 1993 to 2010. Panel B reports percentiles of daily price changes for our sample stocks across 4,420 trading 
days. The first row in Panel B reports the time-series average of cross-sectional means across all trading days. 
The second row is for pooled time-series and cross-sectional averages with 516,963 firm-day observations.  
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TABLE 2. Summary statistics for volume measures 
 Mean Median Sigma Skewness Kurtosis Max. Min.  Mean Median Sigma Skewness Kurtosis Max. Min. 
 Panel A-1: O/S  Panel A-2: Volo/s 
Mean 28.30 1.21 141.61 10.42 216.15 1166 0.07  -2.11 -1.72 3.09 -0.80 4.23 4.42 -10.34 
Median 1.69 0.38 4.76 8.68 114.17 91.99 0.01  -2.13 -1.19 3.36 -0.89 2.88 4.52 -10.40 
Sigma 228 5.62 1276 6.88 403.62 9554 0.70  1.88 2.44 0.75 0.85 3.51 1.95 1.26 
Skewness 10.04 10.23 10.85 4.08 7.57 10.96 11.26  -0.39 -1.35 -0.88 0.66 2.33 -2.10 0.68 
Kurtosis 106.72 107.74 121.28 29.62 72.94 123.90 127.86  3.24 4.60 3.81 3.37 10.97 17.75 5.17 
Maximum 2496.66 60 14390 63.83 4178 10900 0.10  2.68 4.09 5.02 1.96 24.47 11.51 -4.97 
Minimum  0.04 0.01 0.29 3.34 18.34 4.97 0.00  -8.37 -9.72 0.29 -2.71 1.00 -7.23 -13.09 
p value of Nor. Test 0.00        0.12       
 Panel B-1: O  Panel B-2: Volo 
Mean 226.36 61.77 605.59 10.21 189.61 16490 2.74  6.32 6.58 3.20 -0.75 3.84 12.95 1.20 
Median 85.97 15 275.49 8.34 114.64 5072 1.00  6.22 7.31 3.44 -0.84 2.64 13.13 0.98 
Sigma 548.67 146.33 1530 5.23 209.83 71981 0.58  2.24 3.11 0.74 0.88 3.07 2.09 0.14 
Skewness 8.04 5.09 9.06 1.31 2.72 10.94 2.38  -0.07 -1.17 -1.62 0.82 2.67 -3.30 11.48 
Kurtosis 79.63 35.15 96.05 4.47 12.41 125.09 22.06  2.48 3.45 6.87 3.82 15.54 22.24 133 
Maximum 578.14 1233 16931 28.85 1324 83705 5.00  11.22 11.72 4.42 2.09 24.07 18.24 4.60 
Minimum  3.51 1.00 11.31 3.19 14.61 1.00 0.00  1.13 0.00 0.07 -2.79 1.21 0.00 0.00 
p value of Nor. Test 0.00        0.33       
 Panel C-1: VolS  Panel C-2:ln(VolS) 
Mean 0.01 0.00 0.08 8.53 184.09 0.58 0.00  -5.54 -5.50 0.92 -0.33 5.06 -1.98 -10.27 
Median 0.01 0.00 0.01 6.32 82.21 0.13 0.00  -5.51 -5.48 0.84 -0.24 4.18 -2.07 -9.79 
Sigma 0.06 0.00 0.65 6.48 261.40 10.56 0.00  0.98 0.95 0.32 0.72 3.96 1.38 1.96 
Skewness 8.62 4.59 9.34 1.68 2.57 8.39 1.70  1.81 1.24 2.27 -0.82 5.20 0.72 -0.47 
Kurtosis 79.64 37.13 93.13 5.70 9.78 73.00 5.92  23.81 20.10 10.42 12.81 36.57 11.25 6.25 
Maximum 0.56 0.04 6.86 31.07 1372 0.86 0.00  1.55 0.91 2.69 3.19 37.21 4.61 -1.60 
Minimum  0.00 0.00 0.00 1.16 4.21 0.00 0.00  -9.29 -9.29 0.52 -4.09 1.00 -8.16 -17.08 
p value of Nor. Test 0.00        0.00       
Note: This table reports summary statistics for the various volume measures used in the analysis. For each volume measure, we compute the time-series average across 4,420 
days for each stock and then calculate the cross-sectional average for 137 sample stocks. O/S is defined as the total number of option contracts over the total number of stock 
traded. O is defined as the number of option contracts. Vols is defined as total stock volume over the number of shares outstanding. VolO/S and VolO are O/S and options 
expressed as natural logarithms, respectively. ln(VolS ) is Vols as a natural logarithm. The last row in each panel reports p-values for the Jarque-Bera normality test based on 
the cross-sectional mean values.
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TABLE 3. Partial autocorrelations for volume measures 
 Lag(trading days) 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Panel A: Vol O/S      
Mean 0.2615 0.2140 0.1824 0.1601 0.1435 
Median 0.2393 0.1920 0.1652 0.1463 0.1319 
Sigma 0.1055 0.1200 0.0912 0.0800 0.0762 
Panel B: VolS      
Mean 0.4626 0.3194 0.2531 0.2140 0.1900 
Median 0.4774 0.3282 0.2604 0.2216 0.1961 
Sigma 0.1400 0.1077 0.0912 0.0836 0.0748 
Panel C: VolO      
Mean 0.3151 0.2469 0.2079 0.1804 0.1599 
Median 0.2773 0.2203 0.1879 0.1639 0.1459 
Sigma 0.1514 0.1140 0.0963 0.0845 0.0761 
 
Note: Partial autocorrelations using five lags are computed from each ILUP¶VWLPH-series observations 
of VolO/S, VolO, and VolS. Then, the partial autocorrelations are averaged across the 137 sample firms. 
Vols is the total stock volume over the number of shares outstanding. VolO/S and VolO are the 
logarithmic values of O/S and options volume, respectively. There are 4,420 trading days in the 
sample from January 1993 to June 2010. 
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TABLE4. The pre-shock abnormal volume measures 
 Panel A: Negative Shocks (-10%)  Panel B: Positive Shocks (+10%) 
Date AVol S AVol O AVol O/S  AVol S AVol O AVol O/S 
-5 0.0007 0.0162 0.0889  0.0000 0.1337 0.0874 
 (1.05) (0.08) (0.43)  (0.11) (0.70) (0.48) 
-4 0.0003 0.2187 0.1588  0.0006 0.1008 0.0428 
 (0.43) (1.05) (1.75)*  (0.76) (0.51) (0.24) 
-3 0.0002 0.4917 0.4317  0.0003 0.0370 -0.0946 
 (0.19) (2.20)** (2.03)**  (0.58) (0.20) (-0.57) 
-2 0.0003 0.3981 0.3081  0.0008 -0.1708 -0.2815 
 (0.29) (1.95)** (1.65)*  (1.57) (-0.89) (-1.58) 
-1 0.0019 0.4474 0.1905  0.0031 0.2272 0.0573 
 (1.92)* (1.84)* (0.84)  (2.61)*** (1.13) (0.31) 
0 0.0188 1.5574 0.4527  0.0188 2.0887 0.9912 
 (6.49)*** (6.49)*** (2.21)**  (6.23)*** (11.78)*** (6.41)*** 
[-5, -1] 0.0005 0.3079 0.2000  0.0010 0.0507 -0.0606 
 (0.24) (2.27)** (1.66)*  (1.80)* (0.43) (-0.61) 
[-3,-1] 0.0007 0.4457 0.3101  0.0014 0.0064 -0.1444 
 (0.79) (2.83)*** (2.19)**  (2.26)** (0.05) (-1.19) 
Obs 217    287   
Note: This table reports the three abnormal trading volume measures used to investigate the behavior of 
informed traders around informed shocks. AVolS, AVolO and AVolO/S are the abnormal stock volume (the 
number of shares traded over shares outstanding), abnormal option trading volume (the natural logarithm of the 
number of option contracts traded) and abnormal option trading relative to stock trading (options volume over 
stock volume), respectively. Each abnormal volume measure is calculated as its own value on event day t over 
its historical average value during a benchmark period between t-100 and t-11. The fixed windows of [-5,-1] and 
[-3, -1] means averaged abnormal values between event day -5 and -1 and between event day -3 and -1, 
respectively. A negative price shock is defined as a daily price drop of more than 10%, while a positive price 
shock is for a daily price increase of more than 10%. We report the Newey-West adjusted t-statistics in 
parentheses. ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
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TABLE 5. CARs following positive and negative shocks 
  CARs (Cumulative Abnormal Returns) 
Date Positive shocks (+10%) Negative shocks (-10%) 
0 0.1125 -0.1284 
 
(28.92)*** (-16.30)*** 
+1 -0.0016 0.0097 
 
(-0.65) (2.39)** 
+2 -0.0019 0.0148 
 
(-0.53) (3.26)*** 
+3 -0.0040 0.0166 
 
(-1.26) (3.39)*** 
+4 -0.0054 0.0255 
 
(-1.47) (3.65)*** 
+5 -0.0070 0.0242 
 
(-1.61) (3.46)*** 
Obs 287 217 
Note: This table provides the cumulative abnormal returns following 287 SRVLWLYHVKRFNHYHQWVDQG
217 negative shock events over the period from 02/01/1993 to 30/06/2010. We use the FTSE All-Share Index as 
a market portfolio to estimate abnormal returns for each event. The market model is estimated from t-200 to t-11 
and the prediction period is from event day 0 to event day +5. CAR is cumulative abnormal returns, which are 
accumulated from event day 1 to event day 5. We report the Newey-West adjusted t-statistics in parentheses. *, 
**, and *** represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.  
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TABLE 6. High, middle and low abnormal measures and post-shock CARs  
Panel A: AVol O 
 Low Middle  High Low-High MW Test KW Test 
CAR0 -0.1329 -0.1192 -0.1360 0.0031   
 (-10.30)*** (-11.96)*** (-8.14)*** (0.15) (0.16) (1.23) 
CAR1 0.0205 0.0065 0.0031 0.0174   
 (1.89)* (1.23) (0.48) (1.36) (1.06) (1.12) 
CAR2 0.0263 0.0135 0.0049 0.0214   
 (2.04)** (1.86)* (0.68) (1.44) (0.76) (0.58) 
CAR3 0.0359 0.0128 0.0022 0.0336   
 (2.39)** (1.53) (0.29) (1.97)* (1.48) (2.23)** 
CAR4 0.0562 0.0179 0.0049 0.0513   
 (3.17)*** (1.73)* (0.61) (2.62)*** (1.92)* (3.80)*** 
CAR5 0.0579 0.0138 0.0043 0.0537   
 (3.46)*** (1.31) (0.46) (2.81)*** (2.30)** (5.78)*** 
obs 66 86 65    
Panel B: AVol S 
CAR0 -0.1362 -0.1436 -0.1000 -0.0358   
 (-10.69)*** (-10.48)*** (-9.60)*** (-2.17)** (-1.37) (3.28)*** 
CAR1 0.0102 0.0085 0.0108 -0.0006   
 (0.99) (1.66)* (1.40) (-0.05) (-0.34) (0.78) 
CAR2 0.0205 0.0108 0.0142 0.0062   
 (1.64)* (1.62) (1.62) (0.40) (0.39) (0.15) 
CAR3 0.0231 0.0108 0.0177 0.0054   
 (1.61) (1.56) (1.59) (0.29) (0.14) (0.04) 
CAR4 0.0399 0.0161 0.0236 0.0163   
 (2.24)** (2.02)** (1.88)* (0.74) (0.04) (0.04) 
CAR5 0.0412 0.0094 0.0264 0.0148   
 (2.46)** (1.14) (2.01)** (0.69) (0.42) (1.11) 
obs 66 86 65    
Panel C: AVol O/S 
CAR0 -0.1434 -0.1107 -0.1362 -0.0071   
 (-11.23)*** (-11.10)*** (-8.30)*** (-0.34) (-1.06) (7.42)*** 
CAR1 0.0293 0.0005 0.0021 0.0274   
 (2.78)*** (0.10) (0.30) (2.14)** (2.23)** (6.10)*** 
CAR2 0.0349 0.0055 0.0068 0.0282   
 (2.73)*** (0.86) (0.81) (1.83)* (1.71)* (3.31)*** 
CAR3 0.0412 0.0079 0.0034 0.0378   
 (2.73)*** (1.05) (0.38) (2.16)** (1.88)* (4.95)*** 
CAR4 0.0540 0.0235 0.0015 0.0505   
 (3.41)*** (2.23)** (0.13) (2.60)*** (2.33)** (5.84)*** 
CAR5 0.0540 0.0200 -0.0006 0.0546   
 (3.41)*** (1.91)* (-0.05) (2.84)*** (2.52)** (6.55)*** 
obs 66 86 65    
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TABLE 6 continued 
Panel D: Vol O/S 
 Low Middle  High Low-High MW Test KW Test 
CAR0 -0.1351 -0.1165 -0.1315 -0.0035   
 (-10.84)*** (-12.19)*** (-7.92)*** (-0.16) (-0.71) (1.41) 
CAR1 0.0209 0.0076 0.0003 0.0206   
 (1.92)* (1.34) (0.04) (1.61) (1.47) (2.15) 
CAR2 0.0288 0.0110 0.0056 0.0232   
 (2.18)** (1.48) (0.84) (1.55) (0.90) (0.82) 
CAR3 0.0363 0.0119 0.0034 0.0328   
 (2.42)*** (1.36) (0.44) (1.94)* (1.33) (1.98)** 
CAR4 0.0560 0.0167 0.0082 0.0478   
 (3.23)*** (1.53) (0.98) (2.47)** (1.60) (3.30)*** 
CAR5 0.0580 0.0127 0.0078 0.0502   
 (3.45)*** (1.17) (0.86) (2.61)*** (2.04)** (5.23)* 
obs 66 86 65    
 
Note: This table provides cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) conditional on the abnormal options volume 
(AVol O), abnormal stock volume (AVol S), abnormal options volume/stock volume (AVol O/S) and options 
volume/stock volume over the [-3, -1] window prior to the arrival of negative news with a significant price 
impact (İ-10%). The low, middle and high groups are defined as the bottom 30%, middle 40% and top 30% of 
the abnormal measure in question. CARs are cumulative abnormal returns calculated by estimating the market 
model from t-200 to t-11, and the prediction period is from event day 0 to event day 5. We report the Newey-
West adjusted t-statistics in parentheses. We also use two non-parametric tests, Mann-Whitney (MW) and 
Kruskal-Wallis (KW), to examine whether the abnormal returns associated with different groups of stocks are 
statistically different from each other. *, ** and *** represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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TABLE 7. Abnormal measures and post-event CARs 
Panel A: AVolO 
 lnMV Mom lnBVMV Ris  Cons Adj_R2 
CAR [0,+1] 0.0056 0.0417 0.0272 -0.2139 -0.0063 -0.1212 0.09 
 (0.83) (1.90)* (4.52)*** (-0.60) (-1.47) (-1.92)**  
CAR [0,+2] 0.0045 0.0265 0.0274 -0.1634 -0.0056 -0.1134 0.07 
 (0.62) (1.10) (4.16)*** (-0.42) (-1.18) (-1.64)*  
CAR [0,+3] 0.0051 0.0227 0.0297 -0.0972 -0.0066 -0.1172 0.08 
 (0.65) (0.89) (4.21)*** (-0.23) (-1.31) (-1.59)  
CAR [0,+4] 0.0089 0.0192 0.0359 0.1598 -0.0086 -0.0795 0.12 
 (0.11) (0.70) (4.72)*** (0.36) (-1.60) (-1.01)  
CAR [0,+5] 0.0024 0.0221 0.0365 0.3272 -0.0101 -0.0978 0.14 
 (0.29) (0.81) (4.84)*** (0.74) (-1.90)* (-1.25)  
Panel B: AVolS 
 lnMV Mom lnBVMV Ris  Cons Adj_R2 
CAR [0,+1] 0.0038 0.0348 0.0286 -0.1052 0.3092 -0.1213 0.08 
 (0.56) (1.55) (4.59)*** (-0.29) (0.42) (-1.89)  
CAR [0,+2] 0.0042 0.0245 0.0275 -0.1705 0.1856 -0.1142 0.07 
 (0.57) (1.01) (4.15)*** (-0.43) (0.23) (-1.63)*  
CAR [0,+3] 0.0046 0.0199 0.0295 -0.0827 0.7076 -0.1190 0.08 
 (0.58) (0.77) (4.16)*** (-0.20) (0.81) (-1.59)  
CAR [0,+4] 0.0005 0.0159 0.0356 0.1433 -0.6774 -0.0806 0.11 
 (0.06) (0.58) (4.69)*** (0.32) (-0.73) (-1.01)  
CAR [0,+5] 0.0017 0.0185 0.0356 0.3471 -0.4118 -0.0992 0.12 
 (0.20) (0.66) (4.74)*** (0.77) (-0.45) (-1.25)  
Panel C: AVolO/S 
 lnMV Mom lnBVMV Ris  Cons Adj_R2 
CAR [0,+1] 0.0054 0.0421 0.0273 -0.2213 -0.0082 -0.1202 0.09 
 (0.82) (1.92)* (4.55)*** (-0.62) (-1.82)* (-1.90)*  
CAR [0,+2] 0.0044 0.0271 0.0275 -0.1753 -0.0079 -0.1121 0.08 
 (0.62) (1.13) (4.20)*** (-0.45) (-1.70)* (-1.63)*  
CAR [0,+3] 0.0051 0.0237 0.0299 -0.1158 -0.0099 -0.1154 0.08 
 (0.65) (0.93) (4.28)*** (-0.28) (-1.95)** (-1.57)  
CAR [0,+4] 0.0008 0.0197 0.0357 0.1503 -0.0111 -0.0778 0.13 
 (0.09) (0.72) (4.75)*** (0.34) (-2.01)** (-0.99)  
CAR [0,+5] 0.0021 0.0225 0.0362 0.3206 -0.0125 -0.0961 0.14 
 (0.26) (0.83) (4.87)*** (0.72) (-2.24)** (-1.23)  
Panel D: VolO/S 
 
lnMV Mom lnBVMV Ris  Cons Adj_R2 
CAR [0,+1] 0.0126 0.0351 0.0257 -0.1843 -0.0063 -0.1973 0.09 
 (1.62)* (1.59) (4.25)*** (-0.51) (-1.92)** (-2.63)***  
CAR [0,+2] 0.0112 0.0198 0.0263 -0.1563 -0.0058 -0.1842 0.08 
 (1.32) (0.82) (3.97)*** (-0.40) (-1.60) (-2.24)**  
CAR [0,+3] 0.0125 0.0149 0.0284 -0.0867 -0.0054 -0.1960 0.08 
 (1.37) (0.58) (4.01)*** (-0.21) (-1.59) (-2.23)**  
CAR [0,+4] 0.0076 0.0104 0.0337 0.1922 -0.0060 -0.1541 0.12 
 (0.76) (0.38) (4.47)*** (0.43) (-1.40) (-1.66)*  
CAR [0,+5] 0.0109 0.0114 0.0337 0.3918 -0.0057 -0.1936 0.14 
 (1.14) (0.42) (4.50)*** (0.88) (-1.38) (-2.09)**  
 
Note: This table reports the regression results for post-shock CARs. CARs are cumulative abnormal returns 
from day 0 to day +5. Panels A, B, C and D provide results for [ 3, 1]oAVol   , [ 3, 1]sAVol   , / [ 3, 1]o sAVol    and
,[ 3, 1]OAVol  
,[ 3, 1]SAVol  
/ ,[ 3, 1]O SAVol  
/ ,[ 3, 1]O SVol  
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/ [ 3, 1]o sVol   , respectively. lnMV and lnBVMV are total market capitalization and the book-to-market ratio on
 
event day -11, respectively. MOM is the past six-month returns, ending on event day -11. Ris LVDVWRFN¶VUHWXUQ
standard deviations in [-100,-11]. The total number of observations is 217. The Newey-West adjusted t-statistics 
are reported in parentheses. 
 
*, ** and *** represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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TABLE 8. Robustness checks 
 Panel A: £ volume  Panel B: ±5% shocks  Panel C: [-120,-20] 
Date -10% +10%  -5% +5%  -10% +10% 
-5 0.2833 0.2814  0.0094 -0.0935  0.0721 0.1292 
 (0.85) (0.94)  (0.20) (-0.69)  (0.31) (0.69) 
-4 0.2643 0.1684  0.0115 0.1080  0.1756 0.0849 
 (0.98) (0.64)  (0.28) (0.73)  (1.80)* (0.46) 
-3 0.5684 0.1678  0.0470 0.0251  0.4485 -0.0525 
 (1.75)* (0.61)  (0.99) (0.17)  (2.43)** (-0.30) 
-2 0.3673 0.1306  0.1025 0.0979  0.3249 -0.2397 
 (1.68)* (0.55)  (2.13)** (0.73)  (1.96)** (-1.34) 
-1 0.2803 0.1804  0.1069 0.3228  0.2073 0.0152 
 (0.87) (0.76)  (2.10)** (2.34)**  (1.65)* (0.08) 
0 0.7910 1.0698  1.7231 1.1064  0.4694 1.0333 
 (3.03)*** (4.58)***  (4.69)*** (9.30)***  (2.32)** (6.34)*** 
[-5, -1] 0.3397 0.2071  0.0553 0.0922  0.2168 -0.0185 
 (1.85)* (1.49)  (2.26)** (1.05)  (1.86)* (-0.18) 
[-3,-1] 0.4017 0.1841  0.0851 0.1488  0.3269 -0.1023 
 (1.83)* (1.13)  (2.64)*** (1.50)  (2.23)** (-0.84) 
obs 101 111  287 443  217 287 
Note: This table reports the results obtained by using alternative abnormal measures for AVolO/S prior to events. 
Panel A provides results based on the pound volume, AVolO/S. Panel B shows results based on alternative 
definitions for price shocks (±5%). Panel C provides results based on the averaged VolO/S in the period from day 
-120 to -20. We report the Newey-West adjusted t-statistics in parentheses. *,** and *** represent significance 
at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.    
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Appendix A. Event filtering   
Filter Criterion No. of Events 
Panel A: Positive 10% shocks 
1. Total number of events sorted on one-day price change for 137 stocks 
from January 1993 to June 2010 
1267 
2. Number of events with two price changes within [-5, +5] -452 
3. Number of events without news in the Factiva news service* -326 
4. Number of events with no option trading within [-5, +5] -202 
 Total number of events 287 
Panel B: Negative 10% shocks 
1. Total number of events sorted on one-day price change for 137 stocks 
from January 1993 to June 2010 
908 
2. Number of events with two price changes within [-5, +5] -396 
3. Number of events without news in the Factiva news service -160 
4. Number of events with no option trading within [-5, +5] -135 
 Total number of events 217 
   
* 99,167 pieces of daily news are extracted from the Factiva news service for 137 stocks 
from January 1993 to June 2010.   
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Appendix B. News classifications 
News Classifications  -10% Total 
Company appointments, directors and meetings 31 36 67 
Deals, transactions and operational updates 61 50 111 
Documents and circulars 5 3 8 
Equity, debt and investment trusts 39 29 68 
Financial statements and dividends 44 42 86 
Market, Regulatory News Service and related announcements 7 5 12 
Offers Update 9 6 15 
Other statements and announcements 9 1 10 
Publication of prospectus 13 2 15 
Shareholder and Panel on Takeovers and Mergers(POTAM) disclosures 52 34 86 
Undefined 17 9 26 
Total 287 217 504 
Note: We classify the news accompanied by the various price shocks in excess of 10% (sign ignored) into 
eleven categories. These classifications are the official categories used by the London Stock Exchange. Further 
details are available online via the following link: http://www.londonstockexchange.com/products-and-
services/rns/regulatory/headline/explained.htm.     
 
